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Indirect taxes on goods and services at the state level constitute 85 percent of 
own tax revenue of the state governments of which sales tax alone accounts for 61 
percent. A change in regime in recent times from cascading types sales taxes to taxes 
based on input-tax credit within taxation of goods, as well as the adoption of a uniform 
rates of tax, has resulted in buoyant revenues. However, the reform agenda is far from 
complete. The proposed GST regime constitutes the next step towards comprehensive 
reforms of indirect taxes in India. It would be the final step or a step in the right direction, 
depending on how the country chooses to define the constituents of this new regime. 
Decisions on the design of the proposed tax are not yet in the public domain. In this 
context, the objective of this paper is twofold: First, to identify the likely form of the 
proposed tax and the contentious issues that need a resolution before the tax can be 
implemented effectively. Second, given the importance of indirect taxes in the portfolio of 
the states, since any change would not affect all states uniformly, an attempt would be 
made to project the likely impact of one particular design of GST on states. While these 
estimates can at best be tentative, they will highlight the fact that the impact is differential 
across states and these differences would have to be taken into account in designing the 
proposed assignment of tax powers between the centre and the states.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the contours of a feasible 
design of VAT in India. It also takes on board the various alternatives proposed. Section 
3 looks at the issues that need resolution and the options available for resolving the 
same. Section 4 provides estimates of the rates of tax that would ensure that the regime 
is revenue neutral. It also illustrates the differential impact across states, under one 
configuration. This section works with the assumption that there is only one rate of tax 
under the new regime. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 II. Feasible Design of GST for India 
 
 
  Textbook discussions of VAT often present a case for a federal VAT with a broad 
base and few exemptions. Political compulsions and the need to maintain some degree 
of progressivity in the tax system induce deviations from the prescribed coverage. There 
are very few examples worldwide that incorporate a sub-national VAT.
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constitutional assignment of tax powers in India and the current political environment, 
however, purely federal VAT is not considered feasible, even though it may be 
considered desirable in a number of circles. The options left therefore are a dual VAT, an 
integrated VAT, or a state level VAT. Each of these regimes has certain advantages and 
some costs. It would be useful to look at these in some detail. 
 
In contrast to a federal VAT, a state VAT transfers the entire power to tax to the 
provincial governments. The revenue balance in such a regime can be ensured by a 
reduction in the transfers to the provinces from the union government. However, there 
are two major difficulties in implementing such a regime. First, since one of the purposes 
of central transfers is to induce some redistribution of resources, a reduction in the 
transfers can reduce the leverage the union government has in effecting such regional 
redistribution. Second, since the strength of the Indian economy would lie in its forging a 
single common market, form of treatment and monitoring of inter-state transactions would 
be critical in determining the success of such a regime. While destination principle is 
considered appropriate, success of a pure zero-rating mechanism is contingent on a 
reliable and timely information system to record and monitor inter-state transactions. It is 
possible to find solutions to the second problem, however, the first would remain a 
constraint. 
 
A dual VAT proposes two parallel taxes – one by the union government and the 
other by the state governments. In principle, the taxes can be completely unrelated to 
each other and can be run by two or more unrelated tax administrations. In the context of 
India, this would represent some improvement in the tax base for the governments, since 
both the union government and the state governments in India currently work with 
comparatively smaller tax bases. Cascading would be minimised provided provincial 
taxes are not levied on a base inclusive of central taxes.
2 However, the tax system would 
remain as complex as it is today, with 30 different tax laws and the corresponding 
administrations. The changes in coverage and the implied expansion in incidence of tax 
would induce a considerable resistance to such a change. Further, there remains the 
need to put in place a reliable system to monitor inter-state transactions, as in the case of 
the state VAT alternative.  
 
  An integrated VAT as opposed to the above, attempts to design an integration of 
the tax bases for the centre and the states so that together, the taxes cover a 
comprehensive base for VAT. This model would eliminate the duality of taxes on all 
segments of the tax base, however, it would retain the complexity of the dual VAT, 
provided the states are allowed to determine their own rates of tax and maintain separate 
administrations. Further, there would arise need for tax credit to flow across taxes, which 
would make tracking transactions essential and difficult. Another potential difficulty with 
any such design is, with differential growth rates for different segments of the economy, 
any assignment of tax powers would be perceived as unfair by one or the other level of 
government. For instance, if services are allocated to the union government, since this 
sector of the economy is known to grow faster than the other sectors, states would 
perceive this as an unfair assignment of tax powers. 
 
  Clearly, any model that is adopted needs to be modified to suit the needs of the 
hour. A dual VAT with corrections for the problems mentioned would provide a model 
closest to satisfying the needs of both levels of government. This is the model that has 
found support in academic circles and is now being endorsed by the Empowered   5
Committee of State Finance Ministers. The rest of the discussion therefore, focuses on 
this broad structure and attempts to identify the details of any model that can be adopted.  
 
  As the discussion above suggests, a dual VAT empowers both levels of 
government to tax the entire available tax base. In defining the tax base, there will arise 
some exemptions. A conservative picture of the likely exemptions in the proposed regime 
would be as follows: Unprocessed agricultural goods could remain exempt from taxes – 
for reasons of convenience and to present a picture of progressivity in the tax. In the 
present regimes, the central tax does not extend to the agricultural sector and the state 
regimes exempt a number of agricultural commodities – only crops considered to be of 
commercial nature are usually brought under tax.
3 Government services are likely to be 
exempt and so would personal and social services like education and health care. Given 
the rising demand for the latter category of services in India, where it is often perceived 
that the responsibility for the same rests with the government, introducing a tax on the 
same may not be acceptable, at least in the short run. Furthermore, given the well-
documented difficulties in taxing financial services, to being with, it is fair to assume that 
this sector too would remain largely untaxed.
4 In order to ensure a level playing field, it is 
important that exports are zero-rated and imports are subject to GST, i.e., to both central 
and state VAT. The rest of the activities, it is expected, would come within the ambit of 
GST, at both levels of tax.  
  
  In implementing such a regime, it is important to clearly specify a regime for 
taxation of inter-state transactions. This is even more important in the context of services 
which span more than one state. The other important issue that needs to be discussed is 
the nature of administration of such a tax – if the tax base is synchronised/ homogenised 
across the taxes, there is great merit in exploring the options for a unified administration. 
These issues remain as yet unresolved. The options in the same are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
The other major issue that remains to be discussed is the rate of tax that would 
make this regime revenue neutral. There are three distinct issues in any discussion on 
the rates of tax. First, should there be a single rate of tax or multiple rates. While it is 
generally accepted that a regime with a single rate of tax is easier to administer and 
comply with, multiple rates are introduced to address issues of progressivity. Apart from 
issues such as classification disputes and accounting difficulties in a multi-rate regime, 
such regimes introduce perverse incentives. In the present regime of state VAT for 
instance, inputs have been taxed at 4 percent while 12.5 percent is the regular rate on 
goods of final consumption. Such a big divergence between taxes on inputs and final 
products undermines the incentive mechanism of VAT – the manufacturer would not be 
induced to report all his sales since a substantial part of the tax is to be paid at this stage. 
A GST regime with an acceptable tax rate might provide the scope for moving away from 
a multi-rate regime to a single rate regime.  
 
Second, since high rates would induce non-compliance, are there mechanisms 
available to ensure that the rates of GST rates remain modest and yet generate the 
required resources? It is often argued that any tax less than 20 percent would not raise 
the resources required. VAT is often complemented by some non-rebatable excises. 
These excises could be satisfying a number of other objectives like environmental issues, 
discouraging the consumption of tobacco and alcohol, and/or imposing a “luxury tax” on 
select goods associated with relatively higher incomes. In India, no specific emphasis has 
been placed on environmental issues in determining tax structures – however, for   6
reasons of ease of collection, petrol and diesel have been subject to high rates of tax, 
especially at the state level.
5 The state VAT regimes have kept these two products 
outside the purview of VAT.
6 It is feasible therefore to construct regimes which integrate 
these commodities into the general VAT/GST structure and introduce a separate non-
rebatable excise over and above this rate. In the case of tobacco products, especially, 
cigarettes and bidis, the state governments have now introduced a state VAT at 12.5 
percent and the central government imposes specific taxes on these products. The 
central taxes alone contribute anywhere between 17 to 59 percent of the retail prices of 
these products. There is therefore, room to reorganise these regimes into a generalised 
GST and some non-rebatable excises. This would not disturb the government’s overall 
concern to discourage the consumption of tobacco products. For luxury taxes, it is 
possible to identify a number of commodities which satisfy this description. However, in 
order to capitalise on the benefits of introducing a simple and comprehensive VAT, it is 
important to keep this list small. For illustration, we limit this list to include only passenger 
cars and multi-utility vehicles. With these three categories subject to non-rebatable 
excises,  Section 4 explores the rates of tax required to ensure revenue neutrality. 
Depending on the relative distribution of revenues within the new regime, the non-
rebatable excises can be assigned to either the union government or the state 
governments.  
 
Third, would there be uniform taxes across all states? States, till now, have 
autonomy in determining tax rates on bases within their jurisdiction. Since 2000, some 
consensus has been worked out to ensure a degree of harmonisation in the rates. While 
complete harmonisation has not been achieved, it does not appear to be an impossible 
task. It may however, be worthwhile to allow for a degree of autonomy in rates within a 
narrow band so as to address local concerns of individual states. Harmonisation in the 
base however is essential and highly desirable. 
 
  
III. Unresolved Issues and Options 
 
 
1.  Treatment of inter-state transactions: 
  
The present regime of taxation of inter-state sales relates only to the taxation of 
goods and involves tax exportation from the producing states to the consuming states. An 
agreement has been reached to gradually phase out this levy called the Central Sales 
Tax.
7 The budget for the present year has proposed to reduce it from the existing 3 
percent to 2 percent. Complete zero-rating − the result when this tax is reduced to zero −  
would however provide incentives for tax evasion, since there would be considerable 
difference between the taxes on local sales and those applicable on inter-state sales. It is 
imperative that a reliable mechanism for identifying inter-state transactions be introduced 
so as to place a curb on the incentives to evade. The Empowered Committee of State 
Finance Ministers has worked towards the creation of such a database in the form of 
TINXSYS. This system is now more than 2 years old. It captures data on C-forms issued 
by each of the state tax administrations.
8 However, there is no information on the C-forms 
received by the exporting states. The registered dealers are expected to report on C-
forms every quarter. Unless this loop is completed, the information on inter-state 
transactions is not complete and hence not reliable.
9  The chart below provides a 
summary of the information captured in the database for the calendar year 2007.   7
 
This system, by providing information on C-forms issued, does allow the 
exporting state access to some data. However, the verification of information would 
remain a manual and individualised task, losing out on the potential gains from 
implementing a comprehensive system. 
 
 
Source: TINXSYS website.  www.tinxsys.com  
 
In this context it is desirable to go back to the drawing board. The literature 
presents a number of models for treatment of inter-state transactions.
10 Both Canada and 
the European Union use the zero-rating model while the Brazilian system is one central 
levy, bridging the gap. An adaptation of the zero-rating model has often been discussed 
in India – zero-rating with pre-payment, also referred to as zero-rating with reverse 
charge. The system can be broadly summarised as follows:
11 
 
Zero-rating is made conditional on payment of tax in importing state. 
Importing dealer would account for all imports in the monthly return and 
pay taxes on the same. In practice, zero-rating can be reversed if the 
transactions are not reported in the importing state within prescribed time 
limit. It may be mentioned that this places local purchases and inter-state 
purchases on a level playing field since taxes would be payable on both 
these transactions.  
 
The information on these transactions would therefore flow on a month by month 
basis. Information can be captured on individual transactions or on pairs of dealers. It is 
possible to extend this regime to dematerialise the C-forms and ensure that the details 
are captured online by the buyer and the seller as well, by self-issuing a C-form and 
validating the same. In the process, the information can be made more reliable.  
 
While the above deals with transactions involving goods rather efficiently, some 
more details need to be worked out for dealing with services. In the case of services, the 
normal regime would dictate that the tax is payable where the service is rendered.   8
However, when services span more than one jurisdiction, special rules need to be spelt 
out and agreed upon. In defining these rules, it is important to keep in mind the potential 
for ensuring tax credit mechanisms work, if required.  
 




•  Passenger transport services are taxed according to the distances covered. 
 
Example: the price of a bus ticket for a trip from Poland to Austria through 
Germany will include Polish, German and Austrian VAT, proportionate to the 
distances travelled in each of these countries. 
 
• The  intra-Community transport of goods is taxed at the place of departure. If 
the customer is identified for VAT purposes in another Member State and 
provides the supplier with this VAT identification number, the service is however 
taxed in the Member State where the customer is identified. 
 
Example: When goods are transported by a French company from Germany to 
France, German VAT must be paid on the transport. If this service is rendered to 
a customer who is identified for VAT in the Netherlands, Dutch VAT will have to 
be paid, and by the customer himself. 
 
• The  ancillary services to an intra-Community transport of goods, such as 
the loading and unloading services, are taxable in the Member State where 
those services are physically carried out. If rendered to a customer who is 
identified for VAT purposes in another Member State and he provides the 
supplier with this VAT identification number of that other Member State, the 
service is instead taxed in the Member State where the customer is identified. 
 
Example: A Danish company unloads a truck in Rotterdam. If this is done for a 
Dutch customer, the supplier will need to charge Dutch VAT. If, on the other 
hand, the customer is a Finnish company, the place of supply of the service 
rendered by the Danish company is not the Netherlands, where the unloading 
takes place, but Finland, where the customer is identified for VAT. 
 
Chart A below provides a summary of the treatment of transactions in the case of 
telecom services.
13 All these cases illustrate systems for preserving the tax credit 
mechanism for registered taxpayers and at the same time define rules for sharing of 
revenues in all other cases. Some such rules need to be agreed upon, before 
comprehensive taxation of services can be contemplated. Further, clear definitions of 
what constitutes international export of services too need to be agreed upon since zero-
rating at two levels is involved.  
 
2.  Administration of the tax 
 
If the tax bases are successfully harmonised, even with some variation in the tax rates 
across states, it is possible to pool the resources of the tax administrations so as to 
improve tax administration. There is no significant advantage in implementing two 
completely disjointed tax administrations for such a tax regime. The important question 
however is to what extent can and should there be unification of administration. To begin   9
with, it is important to understand the gains from unification or integration. Dealing with 
two tax administrations adds to compliance costs for the tax payer  two returns, two 
sets of officials, and potentially two audits. Some unification therefore would make the 
transition more acceptable. From the point of view of tax administration, the information 
flowing from the taxpayer to a unified administration would be more reliable than to two 
separate administrations. Resources can be conserved by not duplicating routine tasks 
like registration and returns processing. 
 
Having made a case of some unification in administration, it is useful to discuss 
what extent of unification is feasible and/or desirable. In principle, it is possible to imagine 
a single tax administration for this new regime. The regime can be in the form of an 
independent revenue administration which implements the tax laws of both levels of 
government. Or it could be a part of either level of government, which takes responsibility 
to collect revenues on behalf of the other and transfers the same. Such regimes exist in 
Canada for instance. Such a proposal would face one important question  what 
happens to the existing tax administrations? Once again it is possible to subsume 
existing tax administrations within this new arrangement. Even with this problem out of 
the way, it is difficult to arrive at a consensus on such a proposal since there is some 
perceived autonomy with respect to tax administration as well.  
 
The minimum desirable level of integration is one covering registration, returns 
filing, database generation, and management. This level of integration would allow the 
tax administrations to function efficiently and gain from each other’s expertise. A further 
degree of integration could be one where there is a common audit for both the taxes. 
This, as argued earlier, would ensure that the compliance cost for the tax payer is 
minimised. Since the revenue interests of different tax administrations would be different, 
it is possible that some state governments would perceive a given case as a significant 
revenue risk which the central tax administration might not. To allow for these 
differences, the tax departments could have the autonomy to choose cases for audit, 
subject to the condition that the audit would cover both taxes and would therefore apply 
for both levels of government. A common procedure for choosing case for audit therefore 
would need to be developed.  
 
  Between these two extremes, any intermediate position should be 
acceptable to the taxpayer. It is however, important to mention that segregation of units 
by size or economic activity into groups to be administered by one or the other 
administration would hinder effectiveness of administration. It would constitute an artificial 
segregation, and depending on the perceived strength and weakness of the underlying 
administrations, there would evolve an incentive to align oneself to one or the other. This 
would give rise to definitional conflicts of turf between two levels of government, without 
contributing actively to taxes or improved administration or to improved economic 
environment. It is therefore desirable to develop schemes whereby the division of 
functions between the different tax administrations is not of immediate concern and 
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IV. Revenue Neutral Rates of Tax for GST 
 
 
This exercise is based on the All-India Input-Output Matrices, 2003-04.
14 It is 
assumed that the structure of the economy captured by these matrices remains valid for 
the present day as well. Since complete and comprehensive information is available for 
2005-06, the exercise reports results for this year, and follows it up with rough and ready 
estimates for subsequent years.  
 
There are two alternative approaches used to estimate the revenue. Both the 
approaches use common assumptions regarding exemptions, which are listed below. 
The first approach works with overall GDP numbers.
15 The GDP from taxable sectors as 
well as the value of exempt inputs used in these sectors constitute the base for the tax. 
Since even for the taxable activities, imports exceed exports, this provides an acceptable 
estimate of the domestic base provided one assumes that tax credit for capital goods is 
not provided upfront. The second approach is based on estimates for private final 
consumption expenditure. For these estimates, the consumption of taxable goods and 
services and the taxable inputs used by all the exempt goods and services are taken 
together to determine the tax base. It may be recalled that the exempt transactions 
include the exempt goods/services as well as government final consumption expenditure.  
 
Once the base is determined, the rate of tax is sought to be calibrated to ensure 
the same revenue as jointly obtained from the central excise and service tax of the union 
government and the state government’s state VAT and associated taxes, electricity duty, 
passenger and goods tax, and entertainment tax. This exercise also assumes that there 
exist some non-rebatable excises on a few commodities – petroleum products, 
passenger cars and multi-utility vehicles, and tobacco products. This is in consonance 
with the conventional view of keeping VAT simple and addressing issues of externalities 
and inequality through the use of excises.
16  
 
Based on the discussions in the above sections, this exercise works on the 
following assumptions: 
 
•  all agricultural output are exempt – since some of these goods would actually be 
taxable, when used in final consumption, the present estimate provides a 
conservative estimate of the revenues. It may be mentioned that agricultural 
goods used as inputs by other sectors are already accounted in the estimates of 
the base. 
•  all banking and insurance services are assumed to be exempt – however, it is 
not very clear whether there are other heads of activities where some financial 
services may have been accounted for (FISIM as per the GDP estimates).  The 
present regime of service tax does levy some taxes on financial services. To the 
extent some of these levies continue in the new regime, the present estimates 
would also continue to be conservative.  
•  “other services and personal and social services” are considered exempt – these 
include health and education services. While the present sentiment does not 
suggest taxation of these services, it is possible to imagine some segments of 
this broad category being brought under tax.  
•  all sales by government are exempt – holds for central and state governments. 
However, purchases by government are assumed to be taxed.   12
•  exports are to be zero-rated and imports are to be taxed on par with domestic 
production.  
 
GDP Based Estimates: 
  
In this approach, the GDP, i.e., value added in sectors classified as taxable, as 
well as the value of exempt inputs used by these sectors, is considered the base for the 
tax. Value added in exempt sectors is by definition, not a part of the tax base, unless it 
returns to the taxable chain in a subsequent transaction. While the taxable inputs used by 
exempt sectors are subject to a tax, and since these would constitute output of the 
taxable sectors, there is no need to account for this component separately. Using this 
base and with a 7 percent non-rebatable excise on passenger cars and multi-utility 
vehicles, petroleum products and tobacco products, the revenue neutral rate for GST can 
be worked out. Table 1 below provides the figures for three years. As can be noted, GST 
at 10 percent is adequate to raise the revenues required to replace CenVAT and Service 
tax at the central level and sales tax, passenger and goods tax, electricity duty and 
entertainment tax, at the state level. In 2007-08 for instance, the revenue raised from 
these taxes is Rs 3891 billion. Value added in taxable goods and services adds up to Rs 
27755 billion and value of exempt inputs used by these sectors is Rs 5113 billion.
17 10.5 
percent tax on this base yields Rs 3426 billion. A 7 percent non-rebatable excise on 
passenger cars and multi-utility vehicles, petroleum products and tobacco products would 
generate Rs 526 billion
18, together generating Rs 3953 billion. Any assumption to extend 
the base to cover some of the personal services and privately provided health and 
education services or financial services can provide some further revenue.  
 
Based on Private Final Consumption Expenditure: 
  
Using the input-output transactions matrix, the share of taxable consumption 
expenditure in total private final consumption expenditure is computed to be 56 percent. 
Using this ratio on the actual figures for private final consumption expenditure for any 
given year, the taxable component of expenditure can be determined. For the exempt 
sectors and exempt transactions, taxable inputs used for all exempt output needs to be 
identified. For the exempt sectors, using the input-output coefficients matrix, the ratio of 
taxable inputs to gross value added can be obtained. Applying these ratios to GDP from 
each of the exempt sectors, the taxable base is estimated. Similarly, since gross 
domestic capital formation is considered final use in the input output transaction matrix, 
whenever the capital formation takes place in exempt sectors, there is a tax incurred. The 
extent of investment on which such a tax would accrue is estimated by applying the share 
of exempt sectors in total capital formation to the gross fixed capital formation levels for 
the respective years.
19  Further, since we assume that all government expenditure is 
exempt from taxes, the inputs used to fulfil government final consumption expenditure too 
would suffer a tax. The sectoral profile of government final consumption expenditure is 
approximated by the figures obtained from the input-output transactions matrix, and in 
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Table 1: Revenue from GST: GDP based Estimates 
                                                                           (Figures in Rs billion) 
  2005-06 2006-07(R.E.)  2007-08(BE) 
1. CenVAT  1112 1176  1279 
2. Service tax   231 371  506 
3. Sales tax  1356 1659  1921 
4. Electricity duty  77 86  91 
5. Passenger and goods tax  64 77  85 
6. Entertainment tax  7 8  9 
Total Revenue (1-6)  2847 3377  3891 
total revenue (1-3)  2699 3206  3706 
      
Estimates of Revenue      
Rate of GST  10.5 percent  10.5 percent  10.5 percent 
Revenue from GST  2553 2980  3426 
Rate of non-rebatable excise  7 per cent  7 percent  7 percent 
Revenue from excises  420 470  526 
Total Revenue  2973 3450  3953 
Notes: Revenue figures for the state taxes are revised estimates for 2006-07 and budget estimates for 2007-
08. The GDP numbers are quick estimates for 2007-08. 
 
Given the target of revenue, as discussed in Table 1, the rates of tax required 
can be worked out to about 14 percent GST and 10 percent non-rebatable excises on 
passenger cars and multi-utility vehicles, petroleum products, and tobacco products.   
 
Table 2: Revenue from GST: Estimates based on consumption expenditure 
 
(Figures in Rs billion) 
  2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Rate of GST (percent)  13.23 13.44 13.78 
PFCE  20622 23241 26044 
Taxable  part  11512 12973 14538 
Taxes from taxable activities  1522  1744  2003 
Taxes from exempt activities   725  907  1075 
Total  2247 2651 3078 
Rate of excise  10 percent  10 percent  10 percent 
non-rebatable  excises  600 726 813 
Total Revenue Estimated  2847  3377  3891 
Target  Revenue  2847 3377 3891 
     
GST Rates with Informal Sector Corrections 
30 percent informal sector  18.9 percent 19.2  percent 19.7  percent 
25 percent informal sector  17.6 percent 17.9  percent 18.4  percent 
 
  Since it is often argued that a significant component of the Indian economy is in 
the informal sector, which by definition is invisible to the tax system, it is essential to 
make corrections for this aspect as well. Informal sector can potentially assume two 
forms  first, forms similar to unregistered manufacturing, where it is accounted for in the   14
GDP estimates and second, forms where the GDP estimation procedure fails to capture 
the same. Since the latter does not affect our estimates, we attempt to correct for the 
former alone. For the former, since unregistered manufacturing accounts for close to 30 
percent of total value added in the manufacturing sector, this proportion is assumed to be 
representative for the entire economy. Correcting on this basis, it can be shown that the 
rate of GST required to raise the same revenue as above would be 20 percent.  It may be 
mentioned here that the share of unregistered manufacturing is seen to be declining in 
recent times – it has declined from over 34 percent in 1999-00 to 30.6 percent in 2006-
07. If improved tax regimes, including improved tax administration induce further 
reductions in this ratio, a lower rate of GST would be able to ensure the same revenues. 
For instance, if the informal component of the economy is 25 percent of the total, a rate of 
18 percent would be adequate.  
 
An important question that emerges is whether the liability on the passenger 
cars, petroleum products and tobacco products would be raised beyond the present 
levels. Table 3 below presents some comparison of the present and proposed liabilities. 
The proposed liability could be somewhat higher than the present liability in the case of 
passenger cars and multi-utility vehicles. For the other two categories, the differences do 
not appear significant, in general. Specific products however, may face some increases.   
 




CenVAT Sales  Tax 
Passenger cars and 
multi-utility vehicles 
30 percent  16 percent   12.5 percent 
Tobacco products  30 percent  17-50 percent  12.5 percent 




Notes: CenVAT is normally applicable as an ad valorem levy on ex-factory prices. It is however, a specific tax 
for cigarettes and bidis. The liability as a percentage of the retail price works out to be 17 percent for bidis and 
26-59 percent for cigarettes. 
 
The revenue neutral rate for GST appears rather modest and comfortable. Lower 
rates can be achieved by expanding the list of non-rebatable excises and/or hiking the 
rates of tax on these items. The former is not a desirable route since it would defeat the 
basic purpose of introduction of a comprehensive value added tax. An alternative route 
would be to compress the list of exempt activities.  
 
It would in principle be useful to derive such numbers for individual states, based 
on state specific numbers. However, since expenditure based decomposition of GSDP is 
not available, nor have input output matrices at the state level been compiled, one cannot 
generate very reliable numbers for individual states. In what follows, an attempt is made 
to use some proxies to allocate the total revenue for states to individual states. Since the 
base for the new tax is different when compared to the taxes it seeks to replace, the 
revenue in the new regime would not be exactly equal to that in the old regime for each 
individual state.  
 
The approach adopted to derive the share of each state in total revenue is as 
follows: Since there are two components to the tax regime, as a first step, some rule for 
assignment of the non-rebatable excises needs to be worked out. Since the levies are   15
introduced partially to address revenue considerations, it is important that the rate of tax 
as well as the coverage of the tax in these cases be defined and frozen in time. Any 
change in either the base or the rate should require a consensus between all the 
concerned governments. If such rules can be established, the revenues from the above 
can be assigned to any of the two tiers of governments, without apprehensions of uneven 
access to tax bases. Table 4 below provides a comparison of the rates of tax under GST 
for centre and states under two alternative scenarios. For the sake of simplicity, for the 
purposes of this exercise, it is assumed that all the revenues from these levies are 
assigned to the union government. Since most indirect taxes are sought to be zero-rated 
for any exported commodity, such an assignment would allow for easy corrections in 
case the commodity is exported out of the country.  
 
The base for the tax under GST, as discussed above, has two components  
private final consumption expenditure on taxable activities and taxable inputs used in 
exempt sectors and transactions. For the former, the share of states in total taxable 
consumption as per NSS reports is taken as the proxy. Per capita consumption 
expenditure by item for each state is segregated into taxable items of expenditure and 
exempt items of expenditure for rural and urban consumers separately.
21 Population 
estimates for 2005-06 were used to arrive at the state-wise figure for total private final-
consumption expenditure, subject to taxation.
22 The share of each state in the sum of 
total consumption expenditure across states is taken as the proxy for share of the state in 
total revenue from taxing consumption. The rate of GST is assumed to be 14 percent.  
 
 
Table 4: Rates of Tax for Centre and State: Alternative Scenarios  
(percent) 
  2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2005-06 2006-07  2007-08 
Informal sector share  30 percent  25 percent 
Case 1: Non-rebatable excises assigned to the centre 
Centre 6.2  5.9  6.0 5.8 5.5  5.6 
States 12.6  13.4  13.7 11.8 12.5  12.8 
Case 2: Non-rebatable excises assigned to the states 
Centre 11.3  11.3  11.7 10.5 10.6  11.0 
States 7.6  7.9  7.9 7.1 7.3  7.4 
 
For the second component of the base, exempt activities are assumed to be 
closely related to overall GSDP in the state. Therefore, share of the state in sum of 
GSDP across all states is taken as the proxy. It is well recognised that GSDP estimates 
are not comparable across states and hence cannot in principle be added to generate an 
overall estimate. However, under a reasonable assumption that scale of economic 
activity is proportionate to the estimate of GSDP, in the absence of better alternatives, 
the above is used for purposes of illustration. Table 5 summaries the results of this 
exercise. Interestingly, inspite of using rates of tax somewhat higher than the revenue 
neutral rate, the revenue accruing to some of the states falls short of the actual revenue 
collections. Most of the states with actual revenue higher than projected revenue are 
states with relatively higher per capita income. To the extent that NSS data 
underestimates consumption of the higher income categories, the estimates derived here 
would contain a bias in favour of the relatively lower income states. It should however, be 
pointed out that apart from this factor, tax bases focused more closely on consumption 
would tend to induce some redistribution when compared to the present systems, to the   16
extent there is tax exportation on account of CST related provisions within the existing 
regimes. These two effects need to be segregated, so that a suitably designed 
assignment of tax powers can be implemented so as to protect the revenues of the states 
as well as the union government. However, reliable information on CST collections are 
not readily available, due to poor reporting standards. Some states which are known to 
derive revenue from CST actually report zero revenue in their budgets. This segregation 
therefore has not been attempted here. 
  
Table 5: Comparison of Actual and Projected Revenue 
(Rs crore) 
 Actual  Revenue  Projected 
Revenue 
Projected -actual 
  2005-06 2006-07 2005-06 2006-07 2005-06  2006-07 
Andhra Pradesh  12800 17175  12903 15227  103  -1949 
Arunachal Pradesh  48  53  185  214  137  161 
Assam 2646  2907  3082  3628  436  721 
Bihar 2379  2998  7446  8692  5067  5694 
Chhattisgarh 2850  3904  2755  3199  -95  -704 
Goa 879  918  465  551  -414  -367 
Gujarat 12662  15274  10751  12529  -1911  -2746 
Haryana 6437  7682  5058  6115  -1379  -1567 
Himachal Pradesh  859  883  1369  1602  510  719 
Jammu and Kashmir  1409  1568  1844  2128  436  561 
Jharkhand 2300  2648  3262  3817  962  1170 
Karnataka 11276  13821  8731  10105  -2546  -3716 
Kerala 7071  8920  7140  8331  70  -588 
Madhya Pradesh  5938  6558  7746  8975  1807  2417 
Maharashtra 22087  26479  21098  24438  -989  -2041 
Manipur 72  86  265  313  193  227 
Meghalaya 177  190  331  385  153  195 
Mizoram 43  52  171  199  129  147 
Nagaland 79  93  290  345  212  252 
Orissa 3828  4228  3921  4679  93  451 
Punjab 5302  5685  6561  7676  1259  1991 
Rajasthan 6313  7404  9576  11160  3263  3756 
Sikkim 57  51  80  95  23  45 
Tamil Nadu  16647  20025  11412  13332  -5235  -6693 
Tripura 203  247  389  456  186  209 
Uttarakhand 1031  1436  5922  7358  4891  5922 
Uttar Pradesh  11655  15810  16365  18528  4710  2719 
West Bengal  6537  8090  11899  13778  5363  5688 
Delhi 6535  7442  5046  5881  -1489  -1561 
Puducherry 304  357  292  341  -13  -16 
 
Note: Difference in the last two columns is projected-actual revenue. 
Source: Data for actual revenue collections are taken from the RBI, State Finances, 2007-08.   17




The implementation of GST in India in the form of a comprehensive value added 
tax is contingent on several key decisions. While there is clarity that the tax would be in 
the form of a dual VAT, that is the only detail about the tax that is available in the public 
domain. Presuming that the country is going to witness considerable tax reform, it is only 
fair on the taxpayers that the details be worked out well in advance so that preparations 
for a smooth transition can be made. 
 
This paper attempts to identify some of the potential contours of the tax. One of 
the key issues that needs to be resolved is the treatment of inter-state transactions in 
goods and services. The existing consensus of zero-rating by itself would not be 
adequate to address the potential concerns of evasion in such transactions. Zero-rating 
with pre-payment appears to be a superior alternative. The related issue concerns 
taxation of services which span more than one tax jurisdiction. International experience 
points towards self-assessment in the case of registered taxpayers and taxation in the 
jurisdiction of the supplier in other cases, with some revenue sharing among the member 
states. Some of the details need to be worked out before the tax on services can be 
implemented at the state level. A second concern relates to the need to integrate tax 
administration at the two levels in order to maximise on the efficiency of administration. 
While there are options available, a final choice needs to be made, once again 
 
Apart from these design issues, one important concern relates to the rate of tax. 
It is believed and correctly so, that if the rate of tax is “too high”, it induces non-
compliance. In discussions on VAT in India, a rate of 20 percent has often been proposed 
as a feasible rate. Section 4 demonstrates that with the informal sector accounting for 30 
percent of economic activity in taxed transactions, a rate of 20 percent with non-rebatable 
excises of 10 percent on a few selected commodities would be required to generate the 
target revenue. If the non-rebatable excises are assigned to the union government, this 
translates into about 14 percent rate for the states and 6 percent for the centre. It may be 
mentioned that in deriving this rate, all agricultural commodities were considered to be 
exempt. This should mitigate the regressivity normally associated with VAT regimes. The 
above is however a conservative estimate  since a number of activities currently taxed 
have been assumed to be exempt for the purposes of arriving at these estimates. Any 
expansion in the tax base to include some of the activities would allow for a lower rate of 
tax to be implemented. Further, as observed earlier, the share of informal activities in 
total   as proxied by the share of unregistered manufacturing in total GDP from 
manufacturing  is registering some decline in recent times. If this trend persists, there is 
scope for considering lower rates of tax. 
 
Finally, the impact of the tax on different states would be different. Careful 
assignment of tax powers is crucial for the new regime to be acceptable. In the absence 
of the same, transition to the new regime would require some other revenue transfers. 
With the new regime, instruments for the same would be limited, and can generate 
perverse incentives and/or unstable finances for some of the governments involved. 
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9 It has been mentioned that since different states maintain their data in different formats, and 
differing degree of detail, comparable information is not uploaded to the system, making the system 
rather dysfunctional.  
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of United States, see McClure (2005), “Coordinating Sales Taxes with a Federal VAT: 
Opportunities, Risks and Challenges”, Paper presented at Symposium on Federal Tax Reform 
and the States, National Press Club, Washington May 18. 
11 The European model is technically one of zero-rating with reverse charge. 
12http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/vat_on_services/index_en.htm 
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19 Since the decomposition of Gross Fixed Capital Formation is available with a considerable lag, 
the above approach is used to obtain an approximation. In order to obtain a conservative estimate, 
the lowest share observed during 2000-05 is taken as the benchmark - 23 percent, in 2003-04.    
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